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I. Statement of the Case

A. Nature of the Case
Appellant Lynn Schwab ("Schwab") appeals from the District Court's denial
of his Motion in Limine seeking to exclude a 1998 Montana driving under the
influence ("DUI") conviction from being used to enhance a later DUI charge to a
felony in Idaho.
B. Course of Proceedings
On November 23, 2010, the Respondent, state of Idaho (" State"), charged
Schwab by Information with felony Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the
Influence of Alcohol (two or more within ten years), pursuant to Idaho Code §§
18-8004, 8005(6).1 R., pp. 32-33. The "two or more within ten years" charging
enhancement is based, in part, on Defendant's Montana record, which contains a
conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol #2. R., p. 74.

Section 8005(6) provides that "any person who pleads guilty to or is found
guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004( 1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho
Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code,
or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination
thereof, within ten (10) years, notwithstanding the form of the jUdgment(s) or
withheld judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony." (Emphasis added).
1

.

1

On January 3, 2011, Schwab filed a Motion in Limine, seeking to prohibit
the State from using a Montana DUI conviction for the felony charging
enhancement in Idaho. R., p. 47. The District Court denied the Motion. R, pp.
123-29. Schwab entered a conditional plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to
all three counts in the Information,

2

but reserving the right to appeal the Court's

denial of his Motion in Limine. R., pp. 142-44.
On April 7, 2011, the District Court sentenced Schwab on the felony
conviction at issue on appeal to seven years in prison, consisting of a fixed term of
two (2) years, followed by an indeterminate term of five (5) years. The Court
suspended the sentence and placed Schwab on probation for a period of seven
years. R., pp. 149-53. Schwab does not challenge his sentence in this appeal. 3
On May 16, 2011, Schwab filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the
District Court's denial of his Motion in Limine. R., pp. 160-61.

The State also charged Schwab in the instant case with driving without a
driver's license and failure to provide proof of insurance, but those charges are not
at issue in this appeal. R., p. 32-33.
3 The District Court also imposed a fine and costs and sentenced Schwab to
180 terms in jail, with 150 days suspended, on each of the misdemeanor counts, to
run concurrently with his felony sentence, which included 120 days in jail as part
of the probationary term. R., pp. 152-53.
2

2

C. Statement of Facts

The Idaho DUI offense of conviction, from which Schwab has appealed to
this Court, occurred on September 30, 2010. R., p. 7. However, it is the facts
related to an arrest on April 30, 2008 in Montana that are relevant to the issues
raised on appeal.
In April of 2008, the state of Montana charged Schwab with DUI, turning
without proper signal, and driving while suspended. R., p. 65. He appeared in
Court on May 21, 2008, and was advised of his constitutional rights to be
represented by an attorney and to have a trial at which he would have the right to
confront any witnesses called against him. R., pp. 65-66. Schwab entered not
guilty pleas to the charges and indicated that he hoped to hire his own attorney. R.,
pp. 59, 65. Schwab's mother posted bond for Schwab and he was released from
custody. R., p. 123-24. The conditions of bail allowed Schwab to leave Montana
for work-related purposes. R., p. 67. The Montana court did not check the box
requiring Schwab to "PERSONALLY APPEAR FOR ALL Court appearances" as
a condition of release on bail, but only required that he personally appear for
arraignment or trial. Id. (emphasis added).

3

The omnibus hearing held in Montana on July 22, 2008 was neither an
arraignment nor trial.

At that time, Schwab was working in

R., pp. 65, 68.

Torrance, California, and did not appear for the hearing. 4 R., pp. 59, 68; 124.
Schwab had not been able to find an attorney he could afford to hire and so no
counsel appeared for him either. R., p. 59. The Montana court issued a bench
warrant on June 22, 2008, and a notice of trial was mailed to Schwab at an address
written in the court file: 1101 Chamberlain St., in Boise, Idaho. 5 R., pp. 65, 69,
124.

The District Court found that Schwab had provided this address to the

Montana court. R., p. 127. The Montana prosecutor, Nancy Rohde, averred that
"Mr. Schwab's Notice of Bond Forfeiture and his Trial Notice were returned to the
Court with a yellow stamp indicating the premises were Vacant and Unable to

Although Schwab presented evidence about his reasons for not have
knowledge about the trial and for his misunderstandings about the proceedings,
some of which the District Court found not credible, see R., p. 127, even on the
facts as the District Court found them to be and as filled in from the record where
the District Court did not make specific findings of fact, Mr. Schwab submits his
conviction was constitutionally defective and should not be used to enhance his
Idaho DUI charge.
S The address provided to the officer at the time of Schwab's arrest was an
address in Fairfield, Idaho. R., p. 65; 123. The Montana court notices of hearings
and trials were sent to 1101 Chamberlain Street in Boise, Idaho. R., pp. 68-70, 73.
The District Court noted that the Chamberlain address is the one written by the
Montana judge on the Notice to Appear and Complaint (the same document that
also lists the Fairfield address on the citation issued by the Laurel Police Officer).
R., p. 65; 124.
4

4

Forward," and the Idaho District Court cited this fact in the Order on Schwab's
Motion in Limine. R., pp. 94, 125.
Nonetheless, the Montana court went forward with the court trial as
scheduled, on September 9, 2008, without Schwab being present, but there is no
recording or transcript of those proceedings, nor any minutes from the trial. At
that uncounseled and unrecorded trial, of which Schwab averred he had received
no notice, the Montana court found Schwab guilty of the DUI offense (and two
infractions). R., p. 123. Schwab averred that he was at no time advised that a trial
might be initiated in his absence, nor did he waive his right to be represented by
counsel and/or to appear at trial. R., p. 60, at,-r 6. There also is no indication that
the Court reviewed with Schwab the perils of representing himself if he did not
secure the representation of counsel.
It is the use of this un-counseled Montana DUI conviction---obtained at a

trial held in Schwab's absence---to enhance his present DUI charge to a felony that
Schwab challenges. Schwab's Motion in Limine requested that the District Court
prohibit the State from using the conviction to enhance his current DUI charge to a
felony pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8005. That Motion was denied, and the
issues raised below are now brought to this Court for review.

5

II. Statement of the Issues
l. Whether the District Court erred in denying Schwab's Motion in

Limine where the record does not support a conclusion that the
Montana Court followed Montana's statutory procedure for trying a
defendant in a misdemeanor case in abstentia and without counsel?
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding the State had met its
burden to demonstrate that Schwab's 2008 Montana DUI conviction,
used to enhance his Idaho DUI charge to a felony, was
constitutionally sound?
III.

Argument

A. Standards of Review

"This Court defers to the factual findings of the district court unless those
findings are clearly erroneous," but "exercises free review of the district court's
application of the relevant law to the facts." City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,
2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006) (citing Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494,496, 975 P.2d
782, 784 (1999». "Constitutional issues are questions of law over which [the
Court] also exercisers] free review." Id. See also State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89,
91,90 P.3d 314,316 (2004).

6

B. The Burden Was on the State to Demonstrate That no Violation of
Schwab's Rights Occurred With Respect to the Montana Conviction
In State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992), "this Court set forth the
respective burdens for a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction that is used
to enhance a DUI charge from a misdemeanor to a felony." State v. Co by, 128
Idaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 (1996). The State bears the burden of showing the
existence of the prior conviction.

Id.

Once the State meets its burden, the

defendant has "the burden of going forward with some evidence that the conviction
was constitutionally defective." State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 895, 231 P.3d 532,
540 (Ct. App. 2010). See also Coby, 128 Idaho at 92, 910 P.2d at 764. "In tum,
once the defendant raises a triable issue of fact concerning whether he was
accorded his right to counsel, or that he did not properly waive the right, the
burden of proof is then upon the state to rebut the defendant's evidence and
convince the court that no violation of the defendant's rights occurred." Moore,
148 Idaho at 895, 231 P.3d at 540.
Here, the District Court concluded that Schwab "provided direct evidence of
a constitutional infringement of his right to have counsel at his trial" and, therefore,
the burden was on the State "to convince the court that the 2008 conviction was not
entered in violation of Schwab's rights." R., p. 126. Thus, the overarching issue
7

on appeal can be generally stated as whether the District Court properly
determined that the State met its burden in this regard.

C. Montana's Statute Allowing Trial of an Absent Defendant Requires
the Montana Court To Find Schwab (1) Had Knowledge of the Trial
Date and (2) Was Voluntarily Absent Before Proceeding With the
Trial
Montana, by statute, provides courts with discretion to proceed with a trial in
a misdemeanor criminal proceeding, without the defendant's presence, "[i]f the
defendant's counsel is authorized to act on the defendant's behalf . . . or if the
defendant is not represented by counsel." Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122 (2)(d).
However, if the defendant is not represented by counsel, the Court may proceed
with the trial only "after finding that the defendant had knowledge of the trial date
and is voluntarily absent." Id. (Emphasis added). There is no indication in the
Montana state court record that the court made such a finding in Mr. Schwab's
case. The Montana Clerk of the Court advised that there are no audio recordings
of the proceedings in the Montana court case. R., p. 62, at , 3. Accordingly, not
only is there no record that the Montana court made the required finding, but there
also is no record of what, if any, evidence was presented to support the DUI
conviction entered against Schwab in his absence. For this reason alone, Schwab
submits that the State has not, and cannot, demonstrate that his prior conviction in

absentia was valid.
8

The Order for Conditions of Bail entered in the Montana case directed
Schwab to personally appear for arraignment and trial, but did not state that he
must appear for all hearings. R 67. Schwab was absent for one of the "other"
categories of hearings, the omnibus hearing on July 22, 2008, at which his trial
date was set. Schwab averred that he did not receive notice of the September 9,
2008 trial date, R., p. 60,

~

6, and the notice of trial was returned to the Montana

court with a stamp indicating that the Chamberlin Street premises were "vacant"
and they were "unable to fOlWard." R., p. 94, 125. It is unknown whether the
Montana court considered these facts because there is no record of a deliberative
process or a finding made under Montana Code § 46-16-122 (2)( d).

Schwab

submits that this finding is one the Montana court is required to make to effect a
valid conviction upon a trial conducted without the defendant or counsel present
and it cannot be remedied by the Idaho District Court making those findings in the
first instance on collateral attack. Considering the record before this Court, there is
not sufficient evidence to find that the Montana court followed the procedure
required by Montana law.
D. The Constitutions of the United States and Idaho Establish an
Accused's Rights to Due Process, the Assistance of Counsel, and to
be Present at Trial
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial ...
9

and to appear and defend in person and with counsel. No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

(Emphasis

added). See also State v. Miller, l31 Idaho 186,188,953 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App.
1998). The right of an accused to be present at trial is grounded in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522,526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484,84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Additionally, a
defendant has the right to assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and this
Sixth Amendment right is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

E. The Montana Conviction was Obtained in Violation of Schwab's
Right to Counsel
A DUI defendant in Idaho has the right to collaterally attack the
constitutional validity of a prior DUI conviction if that prior conviction was
obtained in violation of his right to counsel. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 94-95,
90 P 3d 314, 319 (2004). Schwab did not have the assistance of counsel at the trial
of this matter. Although he had been informed of his right to counsel at his May
2008 court appearance, he wanted to see if he could afford private counsel before
seeking a court-appointed attorney. At no time did Defendant waive his right to
counsel. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1387 (2004) (noting
10

that any Waiver of the right to counsel must "be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent"). Schwab's entire Montana DUI proceeding was conducted without
the assistance of counsel.
Although the District Court agreed that Schwab provided evidence of a
constitutional infringement of his right to have counsel at his trial, R., p. 126, the
court determined this did not render his Montana conviction constitutionally
defective. The District Court, in considering Schwab's Motion in Limine, noted
that "[p ]resumably if a defendant does not know of his trial date, he could not have
informed his counsel to be present to represent him." R., p. 126. However, the
District Court went on to find that "Schwab intentionally provided an incorrect
mailing address to the court" and his "failure to know of a trial date is directly
attributable to his efforts to keep himself deliberately ignorant by providing a false
address." R., p. 127. Schwab disagrees with this finding and notes that a trial was
not scheduled at his first appearance nor was he told he had to attend all hearings.
The District Court relied, in part, on a Montana case in discussing this issue.

See R 126-27 (citing State v. Weaver, 342 Mont. 196, 179 P.3d 532 (2008)). In
contrast to the Weaver case, Mr. Schwab did not have counsel representing him.

See Weaver, 342 Mont. at 199,179 P.3d at 535. Weaver's counsel appeared at his
trial, even though Weaver did not, and the Montana court took into consideration
11

that Weaver had been ordered to maintain contact with his counsel when the court
determined that Weaver waived his right to be present at trial by keeping himself
deliberately ignorant and not keeping his "obligation to remain in contact with his
counsel". Id. at 199-200, 179 P.3d at 536. If Schwab had the benefit of counsel's
assistance, the facts of this case and Weaver would be more comparable.
One purpose of the constitutional right to counsel "is to protect an accused
from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional
rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).

That is precisely what

occurred here. Schwab's ignorance of how the legal process works, coupled with
the Montana court's willingness to conduct a trial in abstentia, without keeping a
record of the trial, resulted in a conviction that now has collateral consequences for
Schwab in the present case.
Moreover, Schwab was never informed of the dangers of self-representation
he faced if he failed to obtain counsel to represent him.

Although the Sixth

Amendment affords "a defendant the right to forego the assistance of counsel and
to defend himself," State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 633, 167 P.3d 765, 770
(2007) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975)
and Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13), "[t]o be valid, a waiver of the right to counsel must
have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Id. (quoting State v.
12

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003». This Court examines "the
totality of the circumstances in detennining whether ... raJ waiver is valid." Id.
"The State bears the burden to prove that the defendant voluntarily waived his
Sixth Amendment rights." Id. As this Court discussed in Dalrymple, the United
States Supreme Court has "stated the defendant must 'be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" Id. (citing 422 U.S. at 835, 95
S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582). Faretta warnings must be given "so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open. '"

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Montana

court has set forth similar requirements. State v. Colt, 255 Mont. 399, 407, 843
P.2d 747, 751 (1992) (explaining that what it means that Faretta requires the
accused "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation").
Schwab, in effect, was proceeding without counsel when he could not afford an
attorney to assist him, but he did so with no knowledge of the dangers of selfrepresentation and without knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to
counse1. 6

The Montana Supreme Court has stated that it "will not engage in
presumptions of waiver; any waiver of one's constitutional rights must be made
specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly." State v. Bird, 308 Mont. 75, 81, 43 P.3d
266, 271 (2002). Schwab recognizes that many courts have held that a waiver of
the right to counsel can be inferred in some circumstances, see R., pp. 128-29;
6

13

F. Schwab's Montana Conviction is Constitutionally Deficient Because
it was Obtained in Violation of his Right to Be Present at Critical
Stages of Criminal Proceedings
1. The Idaho Constitution and Idaho Law Should Allow Persons
Convicted of Crimes That are Used for Charging Enhancements to
Collaterally Attack as Constitutionally Deficient a Conviction
Obtained at a Trial held in abstentia

The Idaho Constitution has been read in certain circumstances to provide
rights more expansive than those provided by the U.S. Constitution.

Schwab

submits that he should be allowed to collaterally attack the Montana conviction
used to enhance his Idaho DUI charge, based on the denial of his right to be
present at every critical stage of the trial. State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 873,119
P.3d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that a defendant has a right to be present
at every critical stage of the trial); State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 325, 882 P.2d
978, 980 (Ct. App. 1994). Schwab acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Weber contains language that may be, and has been, read to
foreclose such a collateral attack under the federal constitution, but submits that
there is still room for argument under Idaho's Constitutional guarantees.

140

Idaho 89,90 P.3d 314.

however, Schwab submits that the circumstances here are too attenuated to allow
for an inference that he waived his right to counsel.
14

In State v. Weber, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the United States
Supreme Court had "held that, with the sole exception of convictions obtained in
violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding
has no constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state
convictions used to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA)." Weber, 140 Idaho at 92,90 P.3d at 317 (emphasis added) (citing Custis
v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994». The

Idaho Court relied on Custis to determine that "Weber had no right under the
United States Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of his prior

misdemeanor DUI convictions because his attack was based on grounds other than
the denial of counsel." 140 Idaho at 94,90 P.3d at 319 (emphasis added). The
Court also noted that it could interpret the Idaho Constitution to provide greater
protection, but had chosen to align with the federal constitutional standard on the
rights afforded a defendant prior to entering a guilty plea and the propriety of
placing the burden on the defendant to go forward with proof that a conviction was
defective because of the denial of some constitutional right. 140 Idaho at 94, 90
P.3d at 319. This, however, seems to leave open the question of whether the Idaho
Constitution could provide additional protection for a defendant who has been tried
in abstentia, without actual notice of the proceeding, as Weber did not raise this

issue in his appeal.
15

Additionally, the Weber court relied on "[t]he policy considerations
articulated in Custis", see id., some of which are not applicable to the
circumstances of the present case. For instance, one of the rationales stated in
Custis to support a distinction between the denial of counsel and claims of
ineffective assistance of counselor that a plea was not entered knowingly and
voluntarily, which the Weber court repeated, was "ease of administration." Id. at
93,90 P.3d. at 318 (discussing Custis). The Custis court explained that "failure to
appoint counsel at all will generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from
an accompanying minute order." Id. Defendant submits that the violation of his
right to be present at trial is more like the failure to appoint counsel at all than the
other types of alleged constitutional deficiencies because it is easy to detennine on
the face of the records whether Schwab was present at trial and whether he
executed any waiver of his right to be present at trial. 7
Finally, Defendant notes, for persuasive value, that courts in other
jurisdictions have recognized the Custis decision involved a federal sentencing law
The Court in Custis explained that the principles expressed "bear extra
weight in cases in which the prior conviction, such as one challenged by Custis, are
based on guilty pleas, because when a guilty plea is at issue, 'the concern with
finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force. '" Id. (quoting
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087, 60 L.Ed.2d
634 (1979) (footnote and italics omitted)). Defendant notes that he did not enter a
guilty plea and so is not challenging whether his plea was knowing or voluntary;
he was tried in the absence of his or counsel's presence.
7

16

and have declined to apply it to prohibit certain types of collateral attacks on
convictions for state court purposes. See, e.g., Paschal! v. State, 116 Nev. 911, 913
n.2, 8 P.3d 851, 852 (2000) (declining "to adopt such a strict rule limiting
collateral attacks" and noting that the Nevada state court is not bound by the Custis
decision as it involved a federal sentencing law not at issue in Paschall and
determining that Custis "merely established the floor for federal constitutional
purposes as to when collateral attacks of prior convictions may be prohibited");
People v. Soto, 46 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1601-1603, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 596 -

597 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1996).
Most recently, the Montana Supreme Court took up the issue and determined
that the Custis rule is "less protective of a defendant's due process rights than the
established Montana law," thus it "decline[d] to adopt the categorical prohibition
of the [U.S. Supreme Court[]." State v. Maine, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64, 69
(2011). The Montana Supreme Court explained that the Custis decision was based,
in part, on the statutory scheme of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, and
noted

other judicial

criticism

of the

"notion

of 'jurisdictional'

and

'nonjurisdictional' rights". Id. at 69-71. The Montana court cited this Court's
decision in State v. Weber, but decided to "adhere to the principle that ... 'the State
may not use a constitutionally inform conviction to support an enhanced
17

punishment. '" ld. at 73. In reaching its decision to allow a collateral attack to a
charging enhancement conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Montana court relied on the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, which
protects a defendant from being sentenced on misinformation. ld. at 72. Idaho has
a similar due process protection. See State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195
P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that "[s]entencing is considered a
critical stage in the trial process, and the 'constitutional guarantee of due process is
fully applicable at sentencing'" such that "[r]eliance on materially false
information at sentencing violates due process and is an abuse of discretion").
For all of these reasons, Schwab requests that this Court consider whether
the Idaho Constitution allows for challenges to convictions used for charging
enhancements that were secured in the accused's absence from trial.

2. Schwab's Right to Be Present at Trial Was Violated With Respect to
his Montana conviction
"The presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent
that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his or her absence .... " Walsh,
141 Idaho at 873, 119 P.3d at 648 (citing Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at
1484, 84 L.Ed.2d at 490). "The United States Supreme Court has held, however,
that a defendant who was present at the outset of the trial may waive the right to be
present thereafter by absconding or by otherwise voluntarily absenting himself
18

during the trial." Miller, 131 Idaho 186, 188,953 P.2d 626, 628 (citing Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912)).

In the present case, Schwab did not even know a trial was occurring, so he
did not "break up a trial already commenced." Id. Although the United States
Supreme Court has addressed the propriety of conducting a trial in abstentia of a
defendant, see Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 749 (1993),
the Court addressed the issue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 8 and,
finding that rule dispositive, did not reach Crosby's Constitutional objection. The
Supreme Court held that Rule 43 does not permit the trial in absentia of a
defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial.
procedural safeguard for criminal defendants.

Idaho has a similar

See Idaho R. Crim. P. 43(b)

(providing that "[t]he further progress of the trial to and including the return of the
verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived
defendant's right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present ... [i]s
voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced . ... ") (Emphasis added).
The current version of Rule 43 provides: "A defendant who was initially
present at trial, or who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the right to
be present under the following circumstances ... when the defendant is voluntarily
absent after the trial has begun, regardless of whether the court informed the
defendant of an obligation to remain during trial .... " Rule 43( c)(1). The rule
also provides for arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing in a misdemeanor case to
be held in the defendant's absence, but only with "the defendant's written
consent." Rule 43(b )(2).
8
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In contrast, Montana's statute provides courts with discretion to proceed
with a trial in a criminal proceeding, without the defendant's presence, "[i]f the
defendant's counsel is not authorized to act on the defendant's behalf ... or if the
defendant is not represented by counsel." Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122 (2)(d).
However, the Court may do so only "after finding that the defendant had
knowledge of the trial date and is voluntarily absent." Id. There is no indication in
the Montana state court record that the court made such a finding in Defendant's
case, as discussed above.
Even if evidence existed to support a finding that the Montana court made
the appropriate finding of knowledge and voluntary absence, Schwab submits that
commencing a trial in his absence, when he had not appeared for any portion of the
trial, violates constitutional guarantees of due process and the right to confront
witnesses, an issue not resolved in the Crosby case. See, e.g., Elliott, 126 Idaho
323, 325-26, 882 P.2d 978, 980-81 (explaining that Idaho's Rule 43 "essentially
codifies the constitutional principle enunciated in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), that a defendant may waive the right to be
present by voluntarily absenting himself during the trial") (emphasis added».
Thus, the conviction was secured in violation of Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho
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Constitution, which guarantees the right of the accused to be present at trial and
defend in person and with counsel.

IV.

Conclusion

Schwab respectfully submits that his 2008 Montana DUI conviction was
obtained in violation of rights secured by the Idaho and United States Constitutions
and without the findings required by Montana's statutory scheme for conducting
trials with a defendant absent. Accordingly, he requests that this Court reverse the
District Court's denial of his Motion in Limine.
Dated: September 22, 2011.

~

~~EK.BL

~

Manweiler, Breen, Ball & Hancock, PLLC

21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 22, 2011, I caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, in the United States mail with postage prepaid,
addressed to:

LA WRENCE WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

~~~

~1AMES K. BALL,7::-~

Manweiler, Breen, Ball & Hancock, PLLC

22

